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Background
A uniform interpretation of the user requirements
for satellite navigation systems appears quite
difficult to achieve. System users, system
designers and (navigation) specialists are
examples of actors that play a role in defining,
designing, building and using such systems. All
of these actors use similar words and phrases but
use a different language. Obviously
miscommunications are the result.
Navigation specialists in the field of aviation
have gone through an extensive process to define
exactly what they require from a (satellite)
navigation system for operational purposes.
After many reviews, they came up with a short
and simple set of definitions and requirements
(SARPs  [1.] ), which gradually became the basis
for all user requirements stated in terms of
Accuracy, Integrity, Continuity and Availability.
Space systems engineers take the resulting set of
definitions and requirements as a starting point
for defining their system requirements for a
satellite navigation system to be newly built.
This sounds okay so far. However, the carefully
chosen wording in the SARPS [1.] is easily
overlooked, and due to an overlap with the
vocabulary used by system engineers and
navigation experts, many terms obtain multiple
meanings or interpretations. All this results in
confusion and wrong interpretations that severely
affect the system’s design and verification.
On top of this it should be noted that the GNSS
user requirements originate from an already
existing navigation system (i.e. GPS [4.]). These
requirements do not sufficiently take into
account the flexibility one has when designing a
completely new system from scratch.
Furthermore, political and commercial interests
force the system to be defined in a more complex
form than necessary, in order to make it suitable
to any user domain. While the core (limited)
nature of the system: “provision of accurate and
reliable ranging sources” is overshadowed.
The result of all this could lead to a complex, and
difficult-to-verify set of system requirements for
the European GNSS (i.e. GALILEO [2.], [3.]).
Therefore the following simple question needs a
clear and unambiguous answer:
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“What does the Safety of Life user really need
from a satellite navigation system?“
The user community should be assured that “the
right system is being designed” by checking the
correctness/usefulness and the interpretation of
the system requirements. The industry and
customer institutions who drive the development
of the system should be assured that “the system
is designed right” by system verification. All
actors would benefit from a clear and verifiable
set of requirements with one commonly agreed
interpretation.
System description
For clarification a short description of GNSS is
provided, as seen from a user receiver
perspective. GPS [4.] is the actual operational
instantiation of GNSS, that is being augmented
with space based regional overlay systems such
as EGNOS [3.], WAAS [5.] and MSAS [6.].
Next to this, ground based augmentation systems
are being developed such as LAAS [5.]. In
addition Europe has started the development of
its own GNSS: GALILEO. The GALILEO [2.]
definition with its system requirements as
presently available is used as an example here, as
it is supposed to be developed in accordance
with up-to-date user needs, and state-of-the-art
satellite navigation concepts and technology.
GALILEO will provide a number of ranging
sources from the GALILEO Space Segment: a
constellation of 27 satellites, controlled by the
GALILEO Ground Segment. For the satellite-
only services provided by GALILEO all
information for the user is provided through
these ranging signals. In addition to the
information required to determine the Pseudo
Ranges (PR) between satellites-in-view and the
user's receiver, each ranging source contains
error-bounding information concerning the PR
(SISA) that can be used with the momentary
satellite geometry to determine an error-bound in
the position domain: the Protection Level (PL).
As SISA is not updated sufficiently frequently
(order of hours) for many applications, in
addition a near real-time (order of seconds)
“Integrity Flag" (IF) is provided, that can be used
to exclude unreliable signals from the position
solution, as determined by the receiver, within
the specified Time To Alert (TTA).  This TTA
defines the time between the occurrence of a
condition in the GALILEO system that should
lead to an alert for the user, and the actual alert
being provided to the user by the receiver.
It is important to note that the performance of
GNSS for a user ultimately depends on the
achievable Protection Level as computed in the
user receiver. As stated above, this PL depends
on the geometry of the satellites providing the
signals used (i.e. after exclusion of unreliable
ones) and the error bounds (SISA) provided for
each ranging signal, adjusted by the
local/receiver ranging error budget estimates.
System boundary
Although it is clear that some minimum
functionality of the user receiver (i.e. Minimum
Operational Performance Specifications) should
be considered while designing GNSS, the user
receiver should be placed outside the system
boundary. The main reason for this is the wide
variety of receiver implementations and
configurations possible, even for comparable
applications. It complicates system requirements
dramatically, in case all possible receiver
configurations including additional aiding
sensors, have to be addressed.
It is therefore proposed to define the system
performance entirely in terms of the Signal in
Space (SIS) domain. The detailed specification
of the user receiver’s maximum error budgets
and its response to information provided by the
system should be sufficient to determine, in
combination with simulation of the geometry and
a set of environmental assumptions, the
performance in the (user) position domain.
Apart from the technical benefits in system
design, system implementation and system
verification, placing the user receiver outside the
system boundary would enable a clear distinction
to be made between:
• Service provider responsibility: restricted to
SIS and constellation geometry
• Receiver certification: restricted to receiver
performance assuming various nominal and
degraded operational modes of GNSS
service provision
• User operations approval: separation of
service provision quality, receiver quality,
and operational procedures
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Interpretation of performance
requirements
In this paper the emphasis is on the safety critical
performance requirements of Integrity and
Continuity. The main objective of this discussion
is to arrive at an interpretation of the user
requirements that is practical for the system
designer and acceptable for interpretation by the
user.
Service provision
For a GNSS, many different navigation service
levels can be described. However, the general
functionality will be the same.
The main objective for a GNSS is to provide
positioning (PVT) information to the user. The
quality of this positioning information is
dimensioned in terms of Accuracy, Integrity,
Continuity and Availability. Active provision of
an accuracy guarantee (Protection Level) is a
method to optimise the balance between
Accuracy, Integrity and Availability. This
functionality is often referred to as Integrity
Service, thereby creating even more confusion
around the meaning of the word “Integrity”.
In this paper the performance requirements,
Accuracy, Integrity, Continuity and Availability
are treated as quality parameters of the combined
service of positioning and the accuracy
guarantee/alert mechanism.
Accuracy
Accurate positioning is the primary goal of a
GNSS. It is crucial to distinguish the following
forms of accuracy for a GNSS:
• Desired Accuracy statistics or the
distribution of the (true) error statistics. This
is normally stated in terms of a 95%
Navigation System Error bound
(NSE95%)
• Instantaneous Error, the real error of the
position solution, which is not known to the
user. Also called the Position Error (PE).
Note that this could occasionally be higher
than the NSE95% target.
• Instantaneous Accuracy guarantee, the
information as provided through the system,
which bounds the true instantaneous
Position Error. Also called the Protection
Level (PL). Note that this is the “known”
accuracy for the user.
• Required Accuracy, the maximum allowable
Position Error for a certain operation. Also
called Alert Limit (AL).
The user (receiver) will determine his
availability primarily by the equation PL < AL.
Integrity
Integrity is a quality of the positioning and
accuracy guarantee service provided.
For a user, Integrity is not assured when the true
Positioning Error (PE) exceeds the user’s
maximum required accuracy (or Alert Limit)
without an Alert for longer than the Time To
Alert (TTA). An Alert to the user is generated
based on the Protection Level exceeding the
Alert Limit, which implies that, for the system
point of view, Integrity is not assured when the
true Positioning Error exceeds the Protection
Level (PL). This undesired event is also called an
Integrity Event, meaning an event when the
system provides Hazardous Misleading
Information (HMI) at the user output (or
Integrity Risk is not assured). Note that this has
nothing to do with statistics.
Integrity Risk is the user-defined acceptable
level of risk to experience an Integrity Event.
This Risk should be assured anywhere and any
time a user is relying (within coverage and
operational constraints) on the GNSS for a
(critical) operation. Consequently, it is not
permitted to average out the probability of an
Integrity Event over time or location and
therefore, the Integrity Risk is stated in terms of
probability of occurrence per 150 seconds. The
150 seconds relate to a typical duration of a
critical operation for aviation (final approach).
For the analysis of Integrity through the system,
the above implies that the worst geometry and
system configuration should be considered under
which a service is declared available.
The following explains the difference between
Integrity seen from the user point of view and as
seen from the system point of view. In figure 1
all possible configurations for the Position Error
(PE) , with respect to the Alert Limit (AL)
and the Protection Level (PL) are shown (in only
two dimensions). Note that in the positioning
domain there is no relevance for an Integrity
Flag (IF), as these are only defined at SIS level
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and they are applied before computing the
Protection Level.
A. is the nominal situation in which the system
is available and correctly bounding the
Positioning Error;
B. is the most feared situation where the user
with a sufficiently low Alert Limit
experiences an undesirable Integrity Event;
C. although for a user with a sufficiently high
Alert Limit there is nothing wrong, the
system is not correctly bounding the
Positioning Error, i.e. a System Integrity
Event
D. when the system provides a much too
conservative bound, the user might be
unnecessarily alerted for a non existing user
Integrity Event, i.e. a False Alert;
E. although  a user with a sufficiently low Alert
Limit is correctly alerted for an unacceptable
Position Error, the system is not correctly
bounding the Position Error, i.e. a System
Integrity Event ;
F. this is no doubt a safe situation, as in this
case the Position Error is properly bound by
the Protection Level and the user is alerted
not to use the system, i.e. a True Alert;
When considering that the Alert Limit could
differ for every user or operation, this AL should
not be the scope of the system’s Integrity Risk. It
is assumed that (in the worst case) the Protection
Level equals the Alert Limit. Therefore the
Protection Level should be considered as the
guaranteed limit on which the Integrity Risk is
based when defining the system performance.
Leaving out the dotted circles for the Alert Limit
has no impact on the interpretation of Integrity. It
only impacts Availability.
Because the Protection Level still comprises
local receiver effects such as signal selection and
local environmental effects, it is advisable to
define the system Integrity Risk in the Signal in
Integrity event?
PL
AL
C
True Alert
PL
AL
F
Nominal
PL
AL
A
Integrity event!
PL
AL
B
Available:
False Alert
PL
AL
D
Integrity event?
PL
AL
E
Not 
Available:
Figure 1 Integrity definition in a two dimensional plane
IF = Good IF = Alert IF = Not Monitored
SISA > SISE
• Available
• Integrity good
False Alert
• Unavailable
• Integrity good
• Unavailable
• Integrity good
SISA < SISE
Hazardous
Misleading
Information
• Unavailable
• Integrity good
Misleading
Information
• Unavailable
No SISA • Unavailable
Table 1 Integrity and availability in the SIS domain.
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Space (SIS) domain. The same logic can be
applied: the Position Error (PE) can be replaced
by the SIS Error (SISE) and the Protection Level
(PL) can be replaced by the SIS Accuracy
(SISA). In the SIS domain there is one additional
protection in the form of an Integrity Flag (IF),
which informs the user in near real-time
whenever it is detected that a SISA parameter is
exceeded by the SISE. The resulting
configurations are described in Table 1, where
the only real Integrity problem is the Hazardous
Misleading Information provided by one Signal.
It can be (conservatively) assumed that only one
hazardous misleading ranging source (SIS HMI)
could already result in an (user) Integrity Event.
Continuity
Continuous provision of positioning and
accuracy guarantee data is a quality of the
service.
For a user, continuity is not assured when he has
to abort his current operation. To translate this to
the system, it is necessary to know on what basis
the decision to abort is taken. A discontinuity, or
Continuity Event, can be caused by any of the
following events:
• Protection Level changes and exceeds the
Alert Limit from: PL < AL into PL > AL.
Note that this could be caused by both True
and False Alert conditions.
• No Position solution update is generated for
more than (suggestion) six seconds. Note
that according to the Integrity requirement a
user is allowed to experience six seconds of
HMI guidance, which is more unsafe than
continuing six seconds blind on an initially
safe course.
• No Integrity Message is received at the
receiver for more than (suggestion) two
seconds. Two seconds would allow
permitting short outages (e.g. data packet
loss), while the probability that any feared
event occurs at the same instant is negligible
(even if it would be the case, only the Time
to Alert would be increased with two
seconds.
• A Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM) alert is generated.
• Known geometry or system status changes
into a configuration where the Integrity Risk
is known to be unacceptable (e.g. no RAIM
available). It could be justified to permit to
continue an operation for a short period.
It is assumed that when any of these events
occur, the user is instantly notified by an “abort”
alert, and will abort the current operation unless
he has other means to proceed and finalise his
activity in a sufficiently safe manner. Note that
the list of Continuity Event causes does not
cover the Integrity Event. If this was known to a
user, it would not be an Integrity Event.
Continuity of the service has to be assured
anywhere, any time over 15 seconds following a
certain point in time at which there was no
reason to expect a discontinuity of the service
with a probability higher than the Continuity
requirement. This implies that the user assumes a
decision moment. The only reasonable
assumption would be that this decision moment
is at the start of a (short-term) critical operation
during which an abort is undesirable. A typical
critical operation for aviation lasts about 150
seconds (see also the Integrity requirement). The
statement anywhere, any time already prohibits
to average over location or time and implies to
use a worst-case geometry scenario for system
performance analysis of continuity. Therefore it
is strange, unnecessary and only confusing to
state the continuity requirement in a different
interval than the Integrity requirement (15
seconds opposed to 150 seconds).
It is recommended to state the continuity
requirement in a Probability/150 seconds and to
define a minimum duration for positioning and
accuracy guarantee information interruptions.
The nature of the requirement implies that for the
assessment of Continuity Risk (TLH-2) one
should consider the worst case condition under
which a service is declared available (at T0).
Availability
A definition of availability [American National
Standard for Telecommunications]:
“The degree to which a system,
subsystem, or equipment is operable
and in a committable state at the start of
a mission, when the mission is called
for at an unknown, i.e., a random, time.
Note: The conditions determining
operability and committability must be
specified”
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The theoretical “Availability of Accuracy” that is
related to the statistical Accuracy requirement
(NSE95%) does not relate to the actual real term
user Availability. In practise, this availability can
only be determined with hindsight or by
experiments. This is not one of the conditions
mentioned above.
The actual situation, when the user will not be
able to make use of the service, is governed by
the known information and decisions in the user
receiver. The following decision triggers can be
assumed (in other words, the service is declared
available if):
• PL < AL, assuming PL and PVT are
available;
• Minimum redundancy for critical functions
is assured (e.g. for Galileo and EGNOS
Integrity Messages are available via two or
more independent links);
• Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM) status is correct;
• RAIM function is available;
• Short-term (e.g. 150 seconds) prediction
based on current available local geometry
does not reveal eminent discontinuity events
or increased risk of discontinuity. This
prediction could include satellite orbit
propagation, user propagation, masking, and
navigation data validity time.
Note that [PE < NSE95%] or [PE < AL] is not in
the list of unavailability events because if the
real position error was known in the receiver,
one would not need GNSS in the first place!
From the discussion on Integrity and Continuity
it follows that it is not necessary to specify
separately the availability of Integrity and
Continuity as this is already implicit in the I&C
requirements.
For availability, the following conditions should
be identified:
1. Alert to “Abort” safety critical
operation because PL > AL or PVT
is lost
2. warning: “Do not initiate” new
critical operation, due to increased
probability of discontinuity.
3. Nominal condition: where the
system is usable and all performance
requirements are met.
The user geometry is predictable and known
within the user receiver at each point in time-
space. This information could be used to decide
at user-level if a service is considered available.
Real-time information on the system’s internal
configuration status (e.g. failed back-ups) is not
known at the user receiver, unless specific
information is provided to (and used by) the
receiver. Degraded system configurations could
increase the risk of Continuity or Integrity
Events. It is not possible to inform the user of all
degraded system configurations. Moreover, this
would result in more unwanted False Alerts. It
can be justified that as long as for redundant
elements the ratio MTTR/MTBF is sufficiently
small (<<1), i.e. the first failure is repaired
before second failure can be expected) the full
redundant configuration can be considered. For
non (or long-term) repairable redundant elements
the worst case configuration for which a sub-
system is still declared operational should be
considered (e.g. satellites).
Summary performance
interpretation
For safety analysis, the minimum ranging source
geometry should be considered under which a
user receiver does not generate a “don’t use”
warning (e.g. for degraded Integrity
performance).
• Consequence for Integrity: if RAIM is
not available under a certain geometry,
this should either result in a “do not
use” or “abort” at receiver output or the
Integrity Risk requirement should be
met even without RAIM.
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• Consequence for Continuity: When the
user is allowed to initiate a safety
critical operation under the condition
that he experiences one or more critical
satellites1, the continuity performance
must be met, even with the single point
failure of one single satellite (including
outages, True and False Alerts)
• The start of a new operational phase (T0) can
be considered a decision moment for
availability, with the two options: available
or “don’t use”
• The receiver should be able to generate
output in three levels:
• “nominal” or “use”, when there is no
reason to expect problems in the short
term (150 seconds)
• “don’t use” or “do not initiate”, when
the known Accuracy performance (i.e.
PL) is still available and within limits,
but discontinuity risk is known to be not
within acceptable limits
• “abort” when a Continuity Event occurs
(either PL exceeds AL or the Integrity
risk is known to be not within
acceptable limits)
Conclusions
The most important findings are the following:
Availability depends on the system status as it is
known to the user, and the receiver Alert logic. It
does not depend on the actual Positioning Error,
which is, by definition, unknown to the user
receiver.
A user receiver has three output states:
• Nominal
• “do not initiate”
• “Abort”
Integrity Risk and Continuity Risk should be
specified in similar time periods, preferably the
typical duration of a critical operation (150
seconds).
                                                          
1
 Critical satellite refers to a ranging source that
is required to keep the PL > AL, if it is lost or
excluded the PL will drop below the AL and thus
cause a discontinuity.
Interruptions that result in a discontinuity must
have a minimum duration specified
• position data (x seconds)
• integrity data  (y seconds)
Proper interpretation of user requirements and
translation into system requirements is not a
trivial task. This paper suggests a practical way
to make this interpretation, in order to simplify
both performance analysis and system
verification and validation. Some areas, where
the user requirements are somewhat ambiguous,
have been identified.
It is considered important to closely involve the
user community in further iterations to reach
commonly understood and agreed system
requirements between users and developers, such
that the question: "Will the right system be
developed?" will eventually be answered
positively.
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